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Abstract—We introduce a game-theoretic framework to ex-
plore revenue sharing in an Edge-Cloud computing system, in
which computing service providers at the edge of the Internet
(edge providers) and computing service providers at the cloud
(cloud providers) co-exist and collectively provide computing
resources to clients (e.g., end users or applications) at the edge.
Different from traditional cloud computing, the providers in
an Edge-Cloud system are independent and self-interested. To
achieve high system-level efficiency, the manager of the system
adopts a task distribution mechanism to maximize the total
revenue received from clients and also adopts a revenue sharing
mechanism to split the received revenue among computing
servers (and hence service providers). Under those system-level
mechanisms, service providers attempt to game with the system
in order to maximize their own utilities, by strategically allocating
their resources (e.g., computing servers).
Our framework models the competition among the providers
in an Edge-Cloud system as a non-cooperative game. Our
simulations and experiments on an emulation system have
shown the existence of Nash equilibrium in such a game.
We find that revenue sharing mechanisms have a significant
impact on the system-level efficiency at Nash equilibria, and
surprisingly the revenue sharing mechanism based directly on
actual contributions can result in significantly worse system
efficiency than Shapley value sharing mechanism and Ortmann
proportional sharing mechanism. Our framework provides an
effective economics approach to understanding and designing
efficient Edge-Cloud computing systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
Edge computing [1]–[7] is an emerging computing paradigm
that is transforming the landscape of provision and consump-
tion of computing services for a wide range of applications and
end users at the edge of the Internet. This paradigm will be
particularly helpful to those latency-sensitive and bandwidth-
hungry (due to a large amount of data) applications brought
by Internet of Things (IoT) systems.
In this paper, we are interested in a hybrid system where
computing service providers at the edge of the Internet (re-
ferred to as edge providers, which are close to IoT sensors,
mobile devices, and end users) and the providers at the
cloud (referred to as cloud providers) co-exist and collectively
provide computing services to the clients at the edge. Such
a system is referred to as an Edge-Cloud system. Different
from a traditional cloud computing environment in which all
servers are organized in data centers and tightly controlled
and managed by a provider, the various providers that offer
computing servers in an Edge-Cloud system are independent
and located at various distances away from clients, and they
can make independent decisions on the computation resources
that they provide to the system.
In order to achieve a high system-level efficiency, an Edge-
Cloud system adopts a task distribution mechanism to maxi-
mize the total revenue received from clients, and it adopts a
revenue sharing mechanism to fairly split its received revenue
among computing servers (and hence service providers). Un-
der any given system-level mechanism, the providers are likely
to compete with each other and game with the system in order
to maximize their own utilities by strategically adjusting the
resources that they offer to the system.
The self-interested behaviors of those providers might result
in an inefficient system with low overall performance, as their
individual self-interested objectives (a provider tries to maxi-
mize its own utility) do not collectively align with the system-
wide objective (i.e., to maximize the overall system utility).
Therefore, it is important to choose a system-level mechanism
that will minimize the loss of system-wide efficiency in the
face of the self-interested behaviors of the providers. To that
end, we introduce a game-theoretic framework to investigate
the impact of revenue sharing mechanisms on an Edge-Cloud
system’s overall efficiency. To demonstrate the effectiveness
of the framework, we have conducted extensive simulations
and experiments on an edge-computing emulation system.
Our major contributions are summarized below.
1) We introduce a game-theoretic framework to investi-
gate an Edge-Cloud hybrid computing system of edge
providers and cloud providers offering their computing
resources to clients at the edge. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our work is the first to investigate such a problem
from an economics and game-theoretic perspective. Our
findings demonstrate that it is crucially important to
design an appropriate revenue sharing mechanism in
order to maintain high system-level efficiency in the face
of service providers’ self-interested behaviors.
2) We demonstrate the existence of Nash equilibrium in
the game between edge and cloud providers, under
three revenue sharing mechanisms (Shapley value shar-
ing [8], Ortmann proportional sharing [9], and Direct-
contribution-based sharing), and across a wide range of
system/networking settings. We find that when the servers
from different providers have quite different capacities
(e.g., the transmission bandwidth between clients and
servers), different revenue sharing mechanisms can result
in drastically different system-level utility loss at equilib-
ria when compared with maximum system utility (which
is achieved when providers do not game with the system).
3) Our results show that at the Nash equilibria of the
game, Direct-contribution-based sharing (i.e., revenue
split based directly on actual contributions of servers)
results in the worst system-level utility. This seemingly
counter-intuitive result is not surprising, as under Direct-
contribution-based sharing, a provider with very low
transmission bandwidth keeps placing many servers in
the system (as it is rewarded directly based on its actual
contribution) even when doing so actually hurts the
overall system performance. On the other hand, Shapley
mechanism gives the least utility loss in most cases, and
Ortmann mechanism’s utility loss is close to Shapley’s.
This is because Shapley mechanism and Ortmann mecha-
nism discourage a low bandwidth provider from offering
many servers by setting its revenue share as a decreasing
function of its number of servers placed in the system.
4) We demonstrate that our framework is a valid and effec-
tive economics approach to understanding and designing
efficient Edge-Cloud computing systems, based on our
extensive simulations driven by the empirical data derived
from our experiments on an emulation system we have
developed and from Google cloud trace [10].
In the rest of the paper, we first present the architecture
of an Edge-Cloud system and give an overview of our game-
theoretic framework in Section II. Then in Sections III and IV,
we describe task distribution mechanisms and revenue sharing
mechanisms. Section V presents our findings via experiments
and simulations, and we conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. EDGE-CLOUD SYSTEM
In this section, we first discuss background and related
work, and then we give an overview of an Edge-Cloud system.
A. Background and Related Work
This paper studies a computing system in the emerging edge
computing paradigm, which broadly includes cloudlets, mobile
edge computing, fog computing, fog networks, and mobile
cloud computing [1]–[7]. Besides the low latency benefit of
edge computing, recent research on Internet of Things (IoT)
has shown that, by processing at the edge the large amount of
raw data collected by IoT sensors (e.g., in a smart home or
smart city system) or human users (e.g., videos, pictures taken
by smartphones), edge computing can significantly reduce the
consumption of network bandwidth in wide area and core
networks when compared with transferring raw data to a cloud
[11], [12]. AT&T, a large Internet service provider, has recently
announced plans to deploy edge computing servers in their
mobile access towers on a large scale [13]. The economics
and game-theoretic approach adopted in this paper is related
to the existing rich literature of applying economics and game
theory in networking research [14]–[17].
B. System Architecture Overview
There are three types of entities in an Edge-Cloud system, as
shown in Figure 1. (1) Clients, including applications and end
users, that are at the edge of the Internet and submit computing
tasks to the system. (2) Edge providers (computing service
providers at the edge of the Internet and close to clients,
and hence have high communication bandwidth and low
propagation delay to clients), and cloud providers (providers in
the cloud that offer servers to edge clients by joining an Edge-
Cloud system). (3) A system manager, which is a software
component that implements mechanisms/algorithms for vari-
ous management issues such as facilitating task submissions,
revenue collection from clients, revenue split among servers,
accounting/auditing, etc. The main part of the manager resides
on the edge and some of its components are distributed among
providers throughout the Internet. In the system, clients com-
municate with and submit their tasks to the system manager
through apps on their devices.
Fig. 1. System architecture. Computing service providers compete with each
other under system-level mechanisms: task distribution and revenue sharing.
In an Edge-Cloud system, a monetary value is associated
with each task. A system manager’s objective is to maximize
its total values or revenue received from clients via a task
distribution mechanism that optimally assigns tasks to servers
subject to the latency requirements of those tasks. Based on
the revenue collected and the tasks completed by the servers,
the manager utilizes a revenue sharing mechanism to split
the received revenue among the servers (and hence between
the service providers who own those servers). Therefore, an
Edge-Cloud system has two basic types of mechanisms: a
task distribution mechanism and a revenue sharing mechanism.
In this paper, we investigate three types of revenue sharing
mechanisms: Shapley value sharing [8], Ortmann proportional
sharing [9], and Direct-contribution-based sharing. They will
be discussed in detail in Sections III and IV.
C. A Game-theoretic Framework for an Edge-Cloud System
1) Assumptions: We assume that each service provider
in an Edge-Cloud system is independent and self-interested.
This assumption describes an important characteristic of an
Edge-Cloud system: a service provider can choose to join
an Edge-Cloud system and decides by itself the amount of
computing resources it offers to the system. This characteristic
differentiates an Edge-Cloud system from a traditional cloud
computing system in which all computing resources are cen-
trally managed and tightly controlled by an entity and they are
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typically placed in data centers. A traditional cloud computing
provider can also join an Edge-Cloud system and offer service
to the clients in the system, and such a cloud provider is treated
equally as other edge providers in the same system.
We assume that the two types of mechanisms (i.e., task
distribution and revenue sharing) work on individual servers,
without any consideration of the identities of the owners (i.e.,
providers) of those servers, as the objectives of those system-
level mechanisms are to optimally utilize available servers
to maximize total received revenue and fairly distribute the
revenue1 among participating servers. Those mechanisms are
publicly known to all clients and service providers. Under
those mechanisms, a service provider attempts to maximize
its received benefit or utility (defined below) by strategically
adjusting the computing resources it provides to the system.
2) The game: We model the competition among service
providers in an Edge-Cloud system as a non-cooperative game
[18], and the providers are players in the game. We focus on
the case where a provider’s available strategy is to adjust the
number of servers it offers to the system in order to maximize
its utility. A utility function captures the tradeoff between the
revenue and the cost of a provider. Providing more servers
will incur more cost to a provider, even though more servers
imply more revenue that the provider can potentially receive.
Then the utility function of a provider p can be described as
Up(np) = vp(np)− fcost(np) (1)
where vp(np) is the revenue received by provider p when
placing np servers in the system, and the cost fcost is an
increasing function of the number of servers. We focus on a
linear cost function fcost(np) = αpnp with αp > 0.
Now we define a Nash equilibrium [18] for the game we
study through a game of two players: an edge provider E
and a cloud provider C. Let vE and vC denote the revenue
received by the edge player and the cloud player respectively.
Let Mopt and Mshare denote a task distribution mechanism
and a revenue sharing mechanism respectively. Then we know
vE is a function of Mshare and Mopt. Note that Mopt is a
function of (nE , nC), i.e., the number of servers provided by
the edge player and the cloud player respectively, given that
they work on a certain set of tasks.
The edge player and the cloud player attempt to solve the
following optimization problems respectively
max
nE
UE(nE , nC) = vE(Mshare(Mopt(nE , nC))) − αEnE
max
nC
UC(nC , nE) = vC(Mshare(Mopt(nE , nC)))− αCnC
A Nash equilibrium [18] of the game is a particular com-
bination of players’ strategies from which a player has no
incentive to unilaterally deviate (i.e., does not change its
number of servers, given that the other player’s number of
servers remains unchanged), as any unilateral deviation will
1A system manager may keep a share of the total received revenue and split
the rest among servers. We assume that a system manager’s own revenue share
is negligible compared with the rest of the revenue given to servers.
not increase its utility. The Nash equilibrium is denoted by
{n∗E , n
∗
C} (2)
where n∗E = argmaxnEUE(nE , n
∗
C) and n
∗
C =
argmaxnCUC(nC , n
∗
E). Note that the definition (2)
can be easily generalized to the definition of a Nash
equilibrium of a m-player game: {n∗i }, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}
with n∗i = argmaxniUi(ni, n
∗
−i) (where −i denotes the set of
all players except i).
III. MECHANISM FOR DISTRIBUTING COMPUTING TASKS
In this section, we discuss mechanisms that distribute tasks
of edge clients to the servers in an Edge-Cloud system.
A. Objective of task distribution
Since an important application of edge computing is to
serve tasks with low latency requirement, we focus on tasks
with completion deadlines. Recall that a task has a value,
which can be regarded as the payment that the task’s owner
(i.e., a client) is willing to pay for completing the task. The
objective of a task distribution mechanism is to maximize
the total received value (as a revenue) for the tasks that are
completed before their deadlines. In this section, we present
an optimization formulation for the case where tasks arrive in
a batch (i.e., at the same time) to illustrate the characteristic of
task distribution, and then we will present a greedy algorithm
to address a practical dynamic task arrival setting.
B. Optimal Task Distribution Formulation
1) Batch task arrival: A system manager distributes all
tasks arriving in a batch to servers by solving an optimization
problem to maximize the total received revenue from those
completed tasks. We assume that the execution order of those
tasks on a server should be the same as the order of their
arrivals. We also assume that tasks are not splittable.
Let NJ denote the set of tasks with NJ = |NJ |, and let NS
denote the set of servers with NS = |NS |. Tasks are ordered
increasingly according to their arrival times and indexed by
i = 1, ..., NJ , and servers are indexed by j = 1, ..., NS . Let
xij denote the assignment of task i to server j. Then xij = 1
represents that task i is assigned to server j; otherwise xij = 0.
Let dij denote the completion time of task i when it is assigned
to server j. Note that dij includes the computation time of
task i on server j and the time to transfer task i to server j.
In addition, a task i might experience a queuing delay if some
other tasks are scheduled on the same sever (as task i) but
should be executed before task i as they arrive earlier than
task i. Queuing delay is discussed next.
Let vi denote the value of task i or the payment that the
owner (i.e., client) of task i will pay for completing task i. If
task i is completed before its deadline, the system manager
will receive vi; otherwise, the manager receives nothing. The
objective of the manager is to maximize its total received
payment or value (as a revenue) by solving the following
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optimization problem.
maxxij
∑NS
j=1
∑NJ
i=1 vixij (3)
s.t. 0 6
∑NS
j=1 xij 6 1, ∀i (4)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i; ∀j (5)
xijdij +
i−1∑
k=1
qijkdkj 6 Li, ∀i, ∀j (6)
xij = 0→ qijk = 0, ∀i, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., i− 1}; ∀j (7)
xij = 1 → qijk = xkj , ∀i, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., i− 1}; ∀j (8)
qijk ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i, ∀k ∈ {1, ..., i− 1}; ∀j (9)
where (4) and (5) say that a task can be assigned to at most one
server. The three constraints (6), (7), and (8) collectively say
that when assigned to server j, task i should be completed no
later than its deadline (i.e., the maximum allowed latency Li).
Task i’s total delay on server j is given by xijdij+
i−1∑
k=1
qijkdkj ,
as shown in (6). The two constraints (7) and (8) indicate that
qijk is equivalent to xijxkj . Note that (7) and (8) are called
indicator constraints in CPLEX solver [19]. The
i−1∑
k=1
qijkdkj
represents the queuing delay of task i if it is assigned to server
j. Recall that the tasks are served in a first-come first-serve
order. If task k arriving before task i (with k ∈ {1, ..., i− 1})
is also assigned to server j, then task i has to wait till task k is
finished. The queuing delay of task i on server j only makes
sense when task i is assigned to server j. Therefore, (7) says
that when task i is not assigned to server j, its queuing delay
constraint (6) on server j should be removed.
2) Dynamic task arrival: The above optimization formu-
lation for batch arrival of tasks illustrates the nature of the
optimization problem to be solved by an Edge-Cloud system’s
manager, but it is difficult to implement in practice. This is
because usually tasks arrive in a dynamic fashion, and since
they have deadlines, they need to be sent to available servers
immediately in order to meet their latency requirements.
To address the case of dynamic task arrival, we introduce
an online greedy algorithm (shown as Algorithm 1) to be used
by a system manager to maximize its total received revenue.
The idea of the algorithm is: whenever a server is available,
it should be given the task with the highest value among all
tasks that are present in the system and can be completed
before their deadlines by the server.
If all tasks arrive at time 0, then Algorithm 1 is essentially
a heuristic to solve the optimization problem (3) formulated
for the batch task arrival case. In addition, if a task’s value
is inversely proportional to its deadline, then Algorithm 1
is a type of earliest-deadline-first scheduling algorithm, but
without preemptive scheduling. In an Edge-Cloud system,
a server cannot suspend the execution of a task in order
to execute some other task with higher priority, due to the
non-negligible communication cost/delay in edge computing
environment. Both batch arrival and dynamic arrival of tasks
will be investigated in Section V.
Algorithm 1 Online Greedy Task Distribution Algorithm
Require: 〈NJ (T ),NS , T 〉, where T is the time period during
which the algorithm executes, and NJ(T ) is a set of tasks
and their arrival times during T , and NS is a server set.
1: t← 0, Q = ∅ (Q is a priority queue where the task with
the highest value is at the front of Q).
2: while t ≤ T do
3: If a task arrives at time t, insert it into Q:
4: If multiple tasks have the same value, order them
according to their arrival time order.
5: If a set of servers are available at time t (denoted by
St ⊆ NS), use a loop to select all servers one at a time
and in random order from St, and for each selected
server svrj :
6: Start from the front of Q, search for the task with
the highest value among all tasks that can be finished
before their deadlines if processed by svrj . Let task
∗
denote such a task.
7: If task∗ is found, stop search and start a new
thread for svrj to work on task
∗.
8: end while
IV. MECHANISMS FOR REVENUE SHARING
In this section, we investigate the following three revenue
sharing mechanisms: (1) Shapley value [8]; (2) A proportional
sharing mechanism proposed by Ortmann [9], referred to as
Ortmann proportional sharing; (3) and a sharing mechanism
based directly on each server’s actual contribution, referred to
as Direct-contribution-based sharing mechanism.
A. Shapley-value revenue sharing mechanism
Shapley value [8] is a well-known revenue sharing mech-
anism. For an Edge-Cloud system, Shapley value defines a
function that distributes among a set of servers the total
revenue received by the system in organizing the servers to
work on a set of tasks. It specifies that the revenue a server
receives equals the server’s expected marginal contribution.
Formally, consider a set of tasks NJ , and a set of servers
NS (with NS = |NS |). Note that a server can be owned by
a cloud provider or an edge provider. Define the value of set
S, denoted by v(S), as the total received value by only using
servers in set S (with S ⊆ NS) to work on the tasks in NJ .
Note that v is a function of task distribution mechanism. Let φi
denote the revenue share given to server i. The Shapley value
mechanism assigns the following revenue share to server i:
φi(NS) =
1
NS !
∑
S⊆NS\{i}
|S|!(NS−|S|−1)!
(
v(S∪{i})−v(S)
)
(10)
This revenue distribution mechanism satisfies the following
desired property [8], [15], [20], [21]: fairness or balanced
contribution, which says that for any pair of servers i, j ∈
NS , j’s contribution to i equals i’s contribution to j, i.e.,
φi(NS)−φi(NS\{j}) = φj(NS)−φj(NS\{i}). Shapley value
sharing mechanism also has some other important properties
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such as efficiency (the sum of revenue shares distributed to all
servers equals the total received revenue) and symmetry.
1) Computing Shapley values: The amount of time to com-
pute Shapley values for all servers in a game is exponential,
if the computation is done according to the definition in
Equation (10). However, we are able to derive a polynomial
time algorithm, shown as Algorithm 2, based on the following
assumptions. The servers in a system can be divided into
groups, which belong to different providers. For ease of
exposition, assume that a provider has one and exactly one
group. Further we assume that the servers in a group or
provider are identical (in terms of CPU, path bandwidth, and
propagation delay) as they are offered by the same provider.
Then the Shapley values for all servers in a provider should be
the same. Therefore for provider k, we just need to calculate
a Shapley value φi, where i is an arbitrary server in the set
of servers of provider k (denoted by NkS), i.e., i ∈ N
k
S . Then,
provider k’s revenue is vk(Nk) = Nkφi, with Nk = |NkS |.
Algorithm 2 Compute the Shapley value of each server of
m providers in an Edge-Cloud system.
Require: Task set NJ ; Server set NS =
⋃
k N
k
S , where N
k
S is
the set of servers of provider k, Nk = |NkS |, N = |NS |,
k = 1, 2, ...,m.
1: for j = 1, 2, ...,m do
2: Initialize V sj = 0.
3: for nj = 0; nj ≤ Nj − 1 do
4: Do a m−1 level nested loop to find all combinations
(n1, n2, ..., nj−1, nj+1, ..., nm), where each number
nk (with k ∈ {1, 2, ..., j−1, j+1, ...,m}) varies from
0 to Nk.
5: For each (n1, n2, ..., nj−1, nj, nj+1, ..., nm), do:
6: Invoke a task distribution algorithm (e.g., Algo-
rithm 1) for task set NJ to calculate two values
V1 and V2 :
7: V1 = V [n1][n2]...[nj−1][nj ][nj+1]...[nm], i.e., the
value of the set that contains nk servers from
provider k, with k ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}.
8: V2 = V [n1][n2]...[nj−1][nj + 1][nj+1]...[nm].
(Similar to V1, except that nj + 1 is used for
provider j).
9: Calculate Ccoeff = C
n1
N1
·Cn2N2 · · ·C
nj−1
Nj−1
·C
nj
Nj−1
·
C
nj+1
Nj+1
· · ·CnmNm . (Note that Nj − 1 is used for
provider j).
10: Let S =
∑m
k=1 nk.
11: Calculate V incn1,n2,...nj−1,nj ,nj+1...nm =
S!
N ! (N−S−
1)! · Ccoeff · (V2 − V1).
12: Increase V sj by V
inc
n1,n2,...nj−1,nj ,nj+1...nm
.
13: end for
14: Record V sj (Shapley value of a server in provider j).
15: end for
16: Return Shapley value φ
i∈Nj
S
(NS) = V
s
j , with j =
1, 2, ...,m. (All servers in a provider have the same
Shapley value.)
An example of computing Shapley values. We use a simple
example of two providers to illustrate Algorithm 2. Consider
a cloud provider that offers two cloud servers c1, c2 and an
edge provider that offers three edge servers e1, e2, and e3 in
an Edge-Cloud system. According to equation (10), in order
to derive the Shapley value of c1, we need to find the values
of sets S and S
⋃
{c1}. There are 32 such sets (including the
empty set). Due to space limitations, they are not listed here.
However, all three edge servers can be treated as equiv-
alent, and both cloud servers are also equivalent. For ex-
ample, the value of set {c1, e1, e2} equals the values of
sets {c1, e1, e3} {c1, e2, e3}, {c2, e1, e2}, {c2, e1, e3} and
{c2, e2, e3}. Therefore, to calculate the Shapley value of
cloud server c1, we only need to calculate the values of
the following eleven sets {c1}, {e1}, {e1, c1}, {e1, e2},
{c1, c2}, {e1, e2, c1}, {e1, e2, e3}, {e1, c2, c1}, {e1, e2, e3, c1},
{e1, e2, c2, c1}, {e1, e2, e3, c2, c1}, based on Algorithm 2.
2) Time complexity of Algorithm 2: Consider a system of
two providers, in which an edge provider has a set of servers
{e1, e2, · · · , eN1}, and a cloud provider has a set of servers
{c1, c2, · · · , cN2}. All cloud servers are equivalent, and all
edge servers are equivalent. Suppose we would like to apply
Algorithm 2 to calculate the Shapley value of a particular edge
server ei. For any two subsets S1 and S2 that do not contain
ei, we have v(S1) = v(S2) and v(S1
⋃
ei) = v(S2
⋃
ei), if
the number of edge servers in S1 equals the number of edge
servers in S2, and the number of cloud servers in S1 equals
the number of cloud servers in S2. Then, we only need to
calculate the values of (N1 + 1)(N2 + 1) − 1 sets. This is
because, for a set listed in the Shapley value formula (10), the
set might contain a number of edge servers and the number
can be 0, 1, · · · , N1; similarly, the set might contain a number
of cloud servers and the number can be 0, 1, · · · , N2. Thus the
total number of the unique sets is (N1+1)(N2+1)−1, where
the -1 is for removing the value calculation for the empty set
∅ which is always zero. Therefore, the time complexity of
Algorithm 2 is O(N1N2). In general, if there are m providers
which have N1, N2, . . . , Nm servers, the time complexity of
Algorithm 2 is O(N1N2 · · ·Nm).
B. Direct-contribution-based and Ortmann proportional shar-
ing mechanisms
The idea of Direct-contribution-based sharing is simple. A
server is rewarded with a share of revenue that is proportional
to the actual contribution that it has made when working
together with other servers to complete a set of tasks. In the
case where a system manager distributes all of its received
revenue among participating servers (i.e., with no revenue
share left for itself), the amount of revenue that a server
receives is exactly the same amount of payment given by the
clients whose tasks are completed by the server.
Ortmann proportional sharing [9] is a sharing mechanism
that is similar to Shapley value, in the sense that it also
relies on some calculation of the marginal contribution of
a server, instead of relying directly on the server’s actual
contribution. For example, for a system with only two servers i
and j, according to Ortmann proportional sharing, the revenue
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received by server i should be φPi =
v({i})
v({i})+v({j}) v({i, j}),
where v({i}) is the revenue or value generated by the system
when it only contains server i, and v({i, j}) is the revenue
generated by the system when it contains servers i and j. For
a formal definition of Ortmann proportional sharing, see [9].
Note that Ortmann proportional sharing also has a balanced
contribution property, but it differs from Shapley value’s
balanced contribution in the following sense. Under Ortmann
sharing, for any pair of servers i, j ∈ NS , j’s contribution
to i equals i’s contribution to j in terms of quotient, i.e.,
φPi (NS)/φ
P
i (NS \ {j}) = φ
P
j (NS)/φ
P
j (NS \ {i}). That is,
Ortmann’s balanced contribution property is in the form of
ratio equality instead of the difference equality of Shapley’s.
For example, consider a system of two players 1 and 2. Let
v({1}) = 2, v({2}) = 6, and v({1, 2}) = 40. Based on Shap-
ley value sharing, they will get φS1 = 18 and φ
S
2 = 22; based
on Ortmann proportional sharing, they will get φP1 = 10 and
φP2 = 30. The Shapley value sharing satisfies 18−2 = 22−6,
but Ortmann proportional sharing satisfies 10/2 = 30/6.
C. Equilibrium state of an Edge-Cloud system
Recall that we model the competition among multiple
service providers as a non-cooperative game, which is under
the two system-level mechanisms: task distribution mechanism
and revenue sharing mechanism. In this section, a theorem of
the equilibrium state of this game is first proposed and then
proved.
Theorem 1 The game of multiple resource providers in an
Edge-Cloud system has a Nash equilibrium point, which is an
equilibrium system state.
Proof: Recall that in an Edge-Cloud system there is a set
of computing tasks denoted by NJ , a set of servers denoted
by NS with NS = |NS |, and m providers. Without loss of
generality, we consider provider i, and its set of servers is
denoted by NiS , and its number of servers is denoted by
Ni = |NiS |, i = 1, 2, ...,m. Let −i represent the set of all
providers except provider i, Vopt(Ni) denote the maximum
value of the objective function in Eqn. (3). Let N−i be fixed,
Vopt(Ni) is a non-decreasing function of Ni.
There is a threhold of Ni, and let N¯i denote this threhold.
When Ni ≥ N¯i and Ni increases, Vopt(Ni) remains the same
value. That is, once there is a sufficient number of servers from
provider i that can satisfy the server allocation to tasks to get
the optimal value (in solving the task distribution optimization
problem), then further increasingNi will not get any additional
value increase of the objective function.
Let V ∗opt denote the stable maximum objective value of
Vopt(Ni), that is,
V ∗opt = Vopt(N¯i). (11)
Let Vi(Ni) denote the revenue received by provider i as
the result of a revenue sharing mechanism (e.g., Shapley
value) that splits the total value/revenue by solving the task
distribution optimization problem. Then,
V ∗opt = sup
Ni∈Z+∪{0}
Vi(Ni). (12)
In addition, Eqn. (1) shows that the utility of provider i is:
Ui(Ni) = Vi(Ni)− αiNi. (13)
If we take Eqn. (12) into consideration, then we have
Ui(Ni) = Vi(Ni)− αiNi 6 V
∗
opt − αiNi. (14)
Note that αi > 0, thus when Ni >
V ∗opt
αi
, Ui(Ni) < 0. In
addition, this also indicates that once Ni reaches a certain
value, provider i’s utility will be a decreasing function of Ni.
Therefore, Ni is upper bounded
2. Meanwhile, the number of
servers of any provider must be a non-negative integer, which
means Ni ∈ Z+ ∪ {0}. The above discussion shows that the
game is finite [22]. Since every finite game has an equilibrium
point [22], we can obtain the theorem.
Remarks: We observe in our experiments that pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium also exists in some cases, which are shown in
Figures 5 and 6 in Section V.C. When there is no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium state, we use the system performance at
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium to represent system stable
state. When we observe multiple Nash equilibria in some
cases in our experiments, we examine the average system
performance at those equilibrium states.
V. IMPACT OF REVENUE SHARING MECHANISMS ON
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
We discuss in this section the impact of revenue sharing
mechanisms on the performance of an Edge-Cloud system.
Our investigation is mainly conducted through a combination
of emulations and simulations3.
A. Edge-Cloud emulation system
We have built an experimental system to emulate an Edge-
Cloud system, and based on which we have conducted exper-
iments to derive system parameters to drive our simulations.
The system consists of a pool of edge clients (on a number of
Raspberry Pi’s [23] and Ubuntu laptops), a system manager
(a distributed software component), and a pool of servers
(on a number of Ubuntu workstations), as shown in Figure
2. A client at the edge submits its computation tasks to the
manager at the edge who schedules and dispatches received
tasks to servers. There are two types of servers in the system:
edge servers and cloud servers, which respectively belong to
edge service providers and cloud service providers. The edge
servers have higher bandwidth and shorter propagation delays
(on the paths between them and clients) than the cloud servers.
Once a server receives a task, a Docker container [24] will be
launched on the server to process the task. Once the task is
completed, the server will notify the manager and sends back
the result of the task to the edge client. The communication
between the clients, the manager, and the servers is through
Web Application Messaging Protocol (WAMP) [25], a real-
time messaging protocol.
2In practice, Ni is also upper bounded as the number of servers of a
provider is always limited.
3Due to resource constraints, it is impossible for us to conduct Internet-scale
experiments. Therefore we mainly rely on simulations with system parameters
derived from our experiments and empirical trace.
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Fig. 2. Edge-Cloud emulation system.
B. Determining Simulation Parameters
We utilize image processing (a typical edge computing
application) in our simulations to investigate the impact of
revenue sharing mechanisms. In this subsection, we discuss
how to derive system parameters used in our simulations.
We focus on an object detection application, i.e., a client’s
task is to detect whether a specific object appears in a
collection of images. The client submits a collection of images
including the image of the target object and a number of
candidate images in a batch to the system, and then the system
assigns the task to a server. The server launches a Docker
container [24] to process the images using OpenCV [26].
A simulation run is characterized by a group of system
parameters:
{T,NJ(T ),NS, λ, fdelay, klatency , kbw} (15)
where T is the system time duration we simulate, NJ (T )
denotes the set of tasks and their arrival times during T , NS
denotes the set of servers, λ denotes task arrival rate, fdelay
denotes the function to calculate the completion time of a task,
klatency denotes a latency factor, and kbw denotes a bandwidth
factor. These parameters are discussed below.
In our simulations, we let the size of a task be a uniform
random number in range [1, 20] MB. We can think of this task
size in the context of an object detection application as follows.
The average task size 10 MB (in our simulations) roughly
corresponds to a batch of 6 images with a regular image size
(about 1.6 MB on a typical smartphone). The average task
size also roughly corresponds to a collection of 63 images
from the Microsoft COCO image dataset [27] with an average
image size of 159 KB. The value of a task is a number chosen
uniformly at random from range [1, 5].
We assume that tasks arrive at the system in a Poisson
process with rate λ (number of tasks per minute). Poisson
process is a typical stochastic process used in modeling job
arrival process. We choose λ = 40 in our simulations, which
is the average job arrival rate in Google cloud trace [10].
The completion time fdelay of a task on a server depends on
the server’s CPU and bandwidth (of the path between itself and
clients). Through our experiments on the emulation system, we
find that for the object detection application, the computation
time of processing a batch of images is linearly proportional
to the size of the batch. For example, we tested a server in
our experiments, which was a Dell mobile workstation with
Intel Core i7 2.60 GHz, 4 cores CPU, and 16 GB memory.
We randomly selected n images from Microsoft COCO image
database [27] and then ran the object detection application with
OpenCV. Each experimental setting was repeated 10 times.
We choose n = 10, 50, 100, 200, 300, and for each n value
and each experiment replicate, we recorded the total size of
the batch of images. Let ti (sec) denote the computation time
of processing a batch of images of si MB. A plot of ti vs. si
shows a strong linear relationship between them, and a linear
regression analysis shows that ti = 2.6si. We will utilize this
function to calculate the computation time of a task in our
simulations reported in the rest of this section.
A task i has a latency requirement, denoted by Li (i.e.,
the maximum allowed delay). It is determined as follows.
Let Li,avg denote the amount of time to complete task i
on an average server (i.e., a server with an average CPU
power and average bandwidth to clients in the system) without
considering any queuing delay (i.e., waiting for other tasks to
be completed on the same server). Note that Li,avg includes
computation time and task transmission time. Assume that the
average upload bandwidth of the paths from clients to servers
is B Mbps, and assume that an average server has a CPU
similar to the one used in our experiments described above.
Then, Li,avg = 2.6si + (8si/B) + dprop sec, where si is
task i’s size (MB), and the average propagation delay dprop
is negligible compared with computation and transmission
delays. In our experiments, we let the bandwidth from a client
to an edge server be 24 Mbps (i.e., a WiFi environment), and
then we let the bandwidth from a client to a cloud server
be 24/kbw Mbps, where bandwidth factor kbw = 1, 2, 3, and
4 model the practice where a cloud server usually has lower
bandwidth to clients than an edge server. In calculating Li,avg,
we do not consider the time to transfer results back to clients
as the sizes of the results are very small and negligible. Then,
we let Li be a number chosen uniformly at random from range
[Li,avg, klatencyLi,avg], where latency factor klatency ≥ 1. The
rationale of choosing such a latency requirement is that, a
client should not expect that its task to be completed earlier
than what an average server can offer; and it is reasonable
for a client to expect its task to be completed not klatency
times longer than what an average server can offer. The actual
deadline of task i is given by ai +Li, where ai is the arrival
time of task i.
Recall that the utility of a provider p is given by Up =
vp(np) − αpnp. We choose a value for αp to make the cost
of providing a certain number of servers be comparable to
the revenue received due to making those servers available4.
Specifically, we simulated an Edge-Cloud system with an edge
player and a cloud player, and with one-minute simulation
time and λ = 40. We repeated the simulation for various
combinations of the numbers of edge and cloud servers, with a
total number of servers varying from 2 to 30. Based on these
simulation runs, we choose αedge = 4 and αcloud = 3 for
edge and cloud player respectively. We let αedge > αcloud, as
typically a cloud provider can deploy servers with a lower cost
due to it’s economy of scale compared with edge providers.
4As a future work, we will decide empirically the cost coefficient αp by
considering actual operating cost, e.g., power consumption, electricity usage.
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C. Existence of Nash equilibrium and efficiency loss metric
We have conducted extensive simulations of dynamic task
arrivals via an event-driven simulator that we developed in
Python and we have applied CPLEX [19] to solve the op-
timization problem for tasks arriving in a batch. Our results
have demonstrated the existence of Nash equilibrium. In this
subsection, we first illustrate the structure of the game between
two players, through our results on the case of batch task
arrivals, and we introduce a metric to measure the efficiency of
an Edge-Cloud system. Then we discuss the impact of revenue
sharing via simulations of dynamic task arrivals.
Recall that for a batch arrival of tasks, the solution of op-
timization problem (3) gives a system manager the maximum
total received value or revenue by optimally assigning those
tasks to its servers, and then the manager utilizes a revenue
sharing mechanism to split the revenue among its servers.
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providers in an asymmetric game.
Consider a system that consists of two providers, with a set
of tasks arriving in a batch, and Shapley value mechanism is
adopted by the system. First suppose that the servers of both
providers are all identical in terms of CPU and bandwidth.
This game is referred to as a symmetric game. Figure 3 shows
the revenue received by a provider by varying its number
of servers in the system, when the other provider places 6
servers in the system. The revenue curve is increasing and
concave, which shows that the provider’s marginal revenue is
decreasing even though its received revenue is increasing due
to its increasing number of servers. Figure 4 shows the utility
received by the provider. We see that due to the decreasing
marginal revenue and the increasing cost, the utility first
increases and then drops.
Based on the utilities of the two players, we derive their best
response curves [16], [18] and draw them in Figure 5. Each
point of a player’s best response curve represents the player’s
best strategy in response to the other player’s strategy. For
example, a point on the best response curve of player 2 to
player 1 represents the number of servers (the y-axis value of
the point) that gives player 2 the maximum utility given that
player 1 chooses a certain number of servers (the x-axis value
of the point). Therefore, any intersection point of the two best
response curves represents a Nash equilibrium. Figure 5 shows
that the game has two Nash equilibria (n∗1, n
∗
2) = (14, 15) or
(n∗1, n
∗
2) = (15, 14), where n
∗
1 is the optimal strategy of player
1 with respect to player 2’s strategy n∗2, and vice versa.
Note that a typical metric to measure a system’s perfor-
mance at a Nash equilibrium is efficiency loss [16], [28],
which is a comparison between the overall system utility at
the equilibrium with the maximum overall system utility. We
use the relative utility loss of an equilibrium to capture the
efficiency loss of the equilibrium, which is defined as
Uloss =
(
max{np}
∑
p Up(np)
)
−
(∑
p U
NE
p (n
NE
p )
)
max{np}
∑
p Up(np)
(16)
where UNEp is the utility of player p at Nash equilibrium
NE, and max{np}
∑
p Up(np) is the maximum overall system
utility5. For example, in the above game with 50 tasks arriving
in a batch, we observe that the system’s utility loss is around
19.5% at the unique equilibrium6. As another example, we
change the previous game by setting kbw = 4 (then the game
is asymmetric as the two players have different bandwidth).
Figure 6 shows the existence of Nash equilibrium in this game.
D. Impact of Revenue Sharing on System Performance
Our extensive simulations have demonstrated the existence
of Nash equilibrium in the game between edge and cloud
providers in a wide range of system/network settings, when
tasks arrive in a dynamic process. We find that different rev-
enue sharing mechanisms have quite different impacts on the
performance of an Edge-Cloud system, and in general Direct-
contribution-based sharing mechanism results in the worst
system-level efficiency than Shapley and Ortmann mechanisms.
Due to space limitations, we only present in this section some
results of the game between a cloud player and an edge player,
shown in Figures 7 and 8. For ease of exposition, we let the
cloud player’s servers differ from the edge player’s servers
only in the bandwidth of the paths between themselves and
clients, and we let all servers have the same CPU capacity.
Each simulation presented here lasts T = 60 minutes, and
tasks arrive at the system in a Poisson process with λ = 40
tasks per minute. The results of our simulations based on the
empirical task arrival process in Google trace [10] are similar
to the results presented in this subsection.
5It is the solution of a system-wide utility maximization problem, and
the numbers of servers specified by the solution for the providers may not
maximize their individual utilities.
6In some games, there are two Nash equilibria and they are very close to
each other, similar to the case shown in Figure 5. The existence of multiple
equilibria is due to the discrete nature of strategies (i.e., number of servers).
In those cases, utility loss is calculated as the average of those equilibria.
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Fig. 7. Utility loss (compared with the maximum utility) at Nash equilibria.
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Fig. 8. Ratio of the number of servers of the edge player over that of the cloud player at Nash equilibria.
1) Utility loss: We observe from Figure 7 that when the
transmission bandwidth difference between cloud servers and
edge servers is small (i.e., kbw = 1 or 2), the losses of system-
level utility are roughly the same for all three different revenue
sharing mechanisms and across different latency requirement
levels of tasks (klatency = 1.4, 2, 4)
7.
However, when the cloud player’s transmission bandwidth
is significantly lower than that of the edge player (kbw = 4),
Figure 7 shows that Direct-contribution-based sharing gives
the worst utility loss among all three mechanisms, across
different latency requirement levels (klatency) of tasks. In
addition, when tasks have very stringent latency requirement
(i.e., klatency = 1.4), Shapley mechanism gives the lowest
utility loss (only 1.98%). When latency requirement becomes
less stringent (klatency = 2), Shapley mechanism and Ortmann
mechanism have roughly the same utility loss. When tasks
have very flexible latency requirements (klatency = 4), the
utility loss of Shapley mechanism is higher than that of
Ortmann mechanism, but still they both are lower than that
of Direct-contribution-based mechanism.
2) Numbers of servers at equilibria: In addition, we have
also examined the ratio of the number of the edge player’s
servers over the number of the cloud player’s servers at
Nash equilibrium8. Figure 8 shows that when the bandwidth
difference between the two players is not big (kbw = 1 or
2), the edge player has fewer number of servers at equilibria
than the cloud player across all three different revenue sharing
mechanisms and all three different levels of latency require-
ments. This is because the edge player’s cost of placing servers
7If klatency = 1.4, then 1.4Li,avg is the amount of time to complete task
i (without queuing delay) on the server with the lowest bandwidth.
8In the case where there are two Nash equilibria, the ratio is calculated as
the average of the two equilibria, similar to the calculation of utility loss.
in the system is higher than that of the cloud player.
When kbw gets higher (kbw = 4) and task latency require-
ment is stringent or normal (klatency = 1.4 or 2), the cloud
player will place fewer number of servers (than the edge
player) at equilibria under Shapley or Ortmann mechanism.
This is because the cloud player’s servers are less likely able
to meet tasks’ deadline requirements, and the two revenue
sharing mechanisms discourage the cloud player from putting
more servers in the competition. This discouragement leads
to a better system-level performance (i.e., low system utility
loss) than the Direct-contribution-based sharing, as shown in
Figure 7 (a) and (b).
3) The case of large bandwidth difference (kbw = 4) and
stringent latency requirements of tasks (klatency = 1.4): The
disadvantage of Direct-contribution-based sharing mechanism
is quite obvious in this case. Figure 7 (a) shows that its utility
loss (20.08%) is significantly higher than that of Shapley’s
(1.98%) and Ortmann’s (6%).
This is because that under the Direct-contribution-based
sharing, the very low bandwidth provider (i.e., the cloud
player) still aggressively utilizes many servers in order to gain
a high revenue (as they are rewarded directly based on their
actual contributions), which leads to a very low overall system
efficiency. But Shapley and Ortmann mechanisms discourage
such an aggressive behavior of the provider with very low
bandwidth, because our results show that in this case, Shapley
and Ortmann mechanisms give penalty instead of reward to the
low bandwidth cloud servers. Specifically, Shapley mechanism
will start to assign decreasing or even negative revenue to
cloud servers once the number of cloud servers increases
over a threshold (which implies that the addition of a cloud
server with very low bandwidth will bring negative marginal
contribution to the system); and similarly, Ortmann mechanism
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will assign lower and lower revenues to cloud servers. Our
results also show that in this case, Shapley and Ortmann
mechanisms bring significant more revenue to the system
than Direct-contribution-based sharing at Nash equilibria. Our
finding suggests that Shapley and Ortmann mechanisms, the
two mechanisms that distribute revenue based on marginal
contributions instead of directly on actual contributions, can
help improve a system’s overall utility in the face of the self-
interested behavior of providers.
Summary. Shapley mechanism gives the best system-level
performance in most cases in our simulations, despite that
providers game with the system to pursue their self-interested
optimization goals. Ortmann mechanism is similar to Shapley
mechanism in terms of system utility loss at Nash equilib-
ria. Direct-contribution-based mechanism results in the worst
system performance at equilibria.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have proposed a game-theoretic framework to inves-
tigate the impact of revenue sharing mechanisms on the
performance of an Edge-Cloud system in which edge providers
and cloud providers compete with each other and game
with the system in order to maximize their own utilities.
We have found that the revenue sharing based directly on
actual contributions of servers can result in significantly worse
system-level performance than Shapley value and Ortmann
proportional sharing mechanisms at the Nash equilibria of the
game between providers. For future work, we will conduct a
theoretic analysis, study dynamic game playing processes, and
conduct large scale experiments of Edge-Cloud systems.
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